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The Choice Among State Laws
in Maritime Death Cases
David P. Currie*
I. TiE PROBLEM
In October, 1960, a jet airliner sucked a flock of starlings into its
engines and dived into Boston Harbor. Litigation, not surprisingly,
ensued. Preliminary skirmishing in some of the resulting suits over
the appropriate place of trial, plainly promoted at least in part by the
plaintiffs' desire to avoid the 20,000 dollar limitation of wrongful-
death damages imposed by Massachusetts,' consumed several years.
At length the Supreme Court held that transfer from the Pennsylvania
to the Massachusetts federal court was not precluded by the fact that
Massachusetts law forbade suits by foreign personal representatives,
declared that Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules would determine which
law governed damages even if the cases were transferred, and re-
manded for redetermination of the transfer motion.2 A further squab-
ble over the disinterestedness of a trial judge resulted in his
disqualification by the court of appeals.3 Finally at least one of the
claims went to trial in Pennsylvania, and the Third Circuit, in an
opinion styled Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, inconoclastically pulled down
the whole edifice by holding that federal law dictated the application
of the Massachusetts damage limitation because the case was mari-
time.4 An en banc rehearing has been granted,5 and the subject is due
for a canvass.
Of course, the case should never have been held to be maritime
to begin with. The justification for the federal admiralty jurisdiction
is, or ought to be, an interest in promoting the shipping industry.6
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1966), and accompanying notes. For
future accidents the limit was raised to $30,000 in 1962 and to $50,000 in 1965.
2. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
3. Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965).
4. 35 U.S.L.W. 2609 (3d Cir. March 30, 1967). Neither the Law Week excerpt
nor the slip opinion (No. 16328) says whether the plaintiff in Scott had been a party
to the earlier appeals, but the plane accident was the same.
5. So saith the court clerk, in Dec. 1967.
6. See G. GILMonE & C. BLAcK, AD)AmAITY 27 (1957).
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The courts have not accepted the plausible argument that the
entire air transport business comes within this purpose, and, apart
from matters that affect water commerce directly, such as salvage and
collisions with ships, the fact that a plane crashes in water instead of
on land is irrelevant to federal policy. The absurdity of the tradi-
tional location test for admiralty jurisdiction in tort is strikingly em-
phasized by the fact that the same Third Circuit opinion that charac-
terized as maritime a negligence claim against an airplane engine
manufacturer because the plane had crashed into H20 threw out
a warranty claim against the same defendant for the same losses
caused by the same acts because that claim sounded in contract, 7 and
the test of jurisdiction was therefore not locality but subject-matter.
But I digress, for this article is about choice of law, not juris-
diction. Suffice it that the court of appeals was prepared to equate
a damp Convair with a Cunarder 7 A It is a very interesting fact
that in admirality cases, unlike diversity cases, the governing sub-
stantive law, in whatever court, is predominantly federal; the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that the grant of admiralty juris-
diction to federal courts by the Constitution gives federal judges
power to create federal decisional law,8 although the similarly worded
diversity grant does not.9 If this distinction is justifiable, it must
be because of the different purposes the Court has perceived in the
two jurisdictional provisions. The admiralty clause is said to represent
a policy of uniform federal regulation of the shipping industry, while
diversity jurisdiction exists only to protect nonresidents from local
prejudice in the administration of state law.10
Yet the ascendency of federal law in maritime cases has never been
absolute. Early in the nineteenth century, for example, the federal
courts enforced state-created liens for supplies and repairs furnished
a vessel in her home port;" even in the heyday of federal maritime
supremacy States were permitted to give workmen's compensation to
workers injured on navigable waters when the facts were so "local"
that the policy of uniformity was not threatened, 12 and to apply state
7. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). This decision too
arose out of the same plane crash. For detailed consideration of the jurisdictional
issue see D. CtamE, FEDERAL CounTs ch. 4 (to be published 1968).
7A. I am aware that the plane in the actual case had been manufactured by Lock-
heed, but I am a poet.
8. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
9. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
10. See, e.g., id.; Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Currie, Fed-
eralism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. CT. RV. 158-65.
11. E.g., The Planter (Peyroux v. Howard), 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 340-41 (1832).
12. E.g., Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
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law to enforce an arbitration clause in a maritime contract; 3 States
have been allowed to assess maritime employers for unemployment-
compensation contributions 4 and to apply a smoke-abatement code to
interstate ships; 15 state satutes of limitation have been referred to in
determining the basic period for laches in maritime suits.' 6 Perhaps
the most extreme application of state law in recent times was the
1955 decision respecting the effect of harmless warranty breaches in
a maritime insurance policy.7 Finally, and most pertinent to the
Scott case, ever since The Hamilton8 in 1907 the Supreme Court
has made it clear that state wrongful-death statutes may be applied
in maritime cases.
The question naturally arises: When a federal court applies state
law in a maritime case, how does it decide which state law to apply?
Similar questions arise outside the maritime context whenever state
law is referred to in the interstices of federal. How should a fed-
eral court determine, for example, which state's statute of limita-
tion to invoke against a federal claim created by a statute lacking a
limitation period, 9 or which state's law to use in ascertaining whether
an illegitimate is a "child" entitled to renew a copyright after the
death of its owner?20 It was this sort of problem that confronted the
Third Circuit in Scott.
The Klaxon decision made clear that in diversity cases federal
courts were to apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in which
they sat.2' This case has been defended on the ground, among others,
that it minimizes forum shopping between federal and state courts
in the same state.2 It has been criticized for creating unpredictability
13. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
14. Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943).
15. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
16. See Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956).
17. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
18. 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
19. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966). Since Indiana was
"both the forum State and the State in which all operative events occurred," there
was "no occasion to consider whether such a choice of law should be made in accord
with the principle of Klaxon . . . or by operation of a different federal conflict of laws
rule." Id. at 705 n.8.
20. See DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). "[Tlhe only State concerned,"
said the Court, "is California." Id. at 581. Some hint of the approach the Court might
take in such a case if several states were concerned may be found in the statement,
for purposes of choosing among various California definitions of "children," that be-
cause the statutory purpose was "to provide for the family of the author after his
death" the question was one "of the descent of property." Id. at 581-82. But such a
transplantation of categories is dangerous.
21. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
22. See, e.g., the memorandum of Professor Cavers in ALI, STuny OF THE DIVISION
OF JURSDICTION BETVEEN STATE AND Famau. CouRTs 158-59 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1963).
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by promoting shopping among federal courts in different states and
for shutting off the contribution of the neutral federal judges in
resolving interstate conflicts.23 This criticism presupposes three
debatable propositions: that federal courts have the tools to resolve
these conflicts; that it is within the purpose of the diversity grant for
them to do so; that the removal statute24 should be amended (be-
yond the present diversity policy of protecting nonresidents from
bias) to permit a defendant to remove a case filed in his own state
court. In any event Klaxon has been applied to interpleader cases 2
despite the fact that its intrastate-forum-shopping rationale was in-
applicable since the parties could not all have been sued in the
nearby state court. Further, in Van Dusen v. Barrack, an earlier
course of the litigation still boiling in Scott, the Supreme Court
refined Klaxon in accord with its holding that the case should be
decided as it would have been if there were no federal court: After
a case is transferred from one federal court to another under 28 U.S.C.
section 1404(a), the choice of law should generally be made under
the rules of the state where the action was originally filed.26
However, in all the foregoing cases the Court was considering
situations in which, under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 7 the federal court
sat as a disinterested forum, constitutionally and by congressional
command impotent to meddle with the merits. This principle did
not dictate the Klaxon decision; for, within broad limits, Erie is satis-
23. See, e.g., H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEm 634-36 (1953).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
25. Griffith v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). The availability of nationwide
process in interpleader greatly enhances the danger of interstate forum shopping. See
also Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 786-87
(1963): "Vhen power to select the forum is lodged not in either of the adverse parties
but in a stakeholder who is theoretically disinterested, but actually in excellent position
to play games of collusion, mandatory determination of the case in accordance with
the choice-of-law rules of the forum is indefensible."
26. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). The Court quite correctly cautioned that matters might
be different if transfer were sought by the plaintiff, or from a court in which the
suit was improperly brought (where possibly the state court would lack jurisdiction),
or if the transferor state would invoke forum non conveniens. See ALI, STUDy or Ttit.
DIVISIONS OF JUISDICTI Or BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CoUnTs, pt. I, proposed §§
1305(c), 1306(c) (Official Draft 1965), and the criticism of the ALI proposals in
Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEIMP. Pnon. 754, 790-94 (1963).
Compare the question of which state's law to use when parties not subject to state
court process are brought into federal court on claims pendent to federal causes for
which nationwide service is provided, or by service within 100 miles of the court
in impleader as authorized by Rule 4(f), FED. R. Civ. P. See Cavers, The Changing
Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 732, 750-52
(1963). See also Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541,
545, 553-54, 557-58, 564 (1958), discussing some of the above situations as well as
the general question whether, in light of Erie's purpose of respect for state interests,
Klaxon should apply when the forum state is disinterested.
27. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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fled as well by the use of one state's law as by another's.28 Yet plainly
Klaxon is an outgrowth of Erie. Perhaps Klaxon should not be fol-
lowed when, as in maritime cases and those based on federal statutes,
the Erie compulsion to apply state substantive law is absent.
When the choice is between federal law and the law of a foreign
country, it would be silly to follow state choice-of-law rules. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that this question involves essen-
tially the construction of the federal law in the light of foreign inter-
ests, and there is no reason to inject disuniformity.29 Thus, in Siegleman
v. Cunard White Star, Ltd.,30 the Second Circuit expressly declared
Klaxon inapplicable in choosing between federal and English law
respecting the effect of a time limitation on injury claims in a
contract of ocean passage. Since the claim was federal, uniformity
could be assured without Klaxon: even a state court might be re-
quired to apply federal choice-of-law principles. Perhaps, the court
conceded, Klaxon might apply even in admiralty if, as in wrongful-
death cases, the claim were based upon "a state-created right."
In such a case, however, "it is possible that the federal court would
not be bound by the state's choice-of-law rule, unless the rule
limited the scope of the right."
Scott v. Eastern Air Lines presented the problem left unsolved in
Siegelman: choosing between Massachusetts and Pennsylvania laws
respecting damages for a wrongful death in the admiralty jurisdic-
tion. Deciding whether in this kind of case Klaxon should be followed
requires discussion both of the reasons for applying state wrongful-
death laws in admiralty and of modern choice-of-law learning.
II. WRoNGFUL DEATH IN ADMIRALTY
Consideration of wrongful death in admiralty takes us back to the
1886 case of The Harrisburg.31 The Court there held that the maritime
law, like the common law, historically made no provision for recovery
in death cases. Moreover, the Court refused to create a maritime
remedy because "it is the duty of courts to declare the law, not to
make it." As Mr. Justice Brennan later made clearer by analogy,
this does not suggest a substantive policy opposing relief but rather
indicates "the felt necessity of having some statutory definition"3 -a
28. Erie, for example, would be just as compelling if there were only one federal
court, and that located in Washington, D.C.; but nobody would ever have conceived
of Klaxon.
29. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
30. 221 F.2d 189, 192-93 (2d Cir. 1955).
31. 119 U.S. 199, 212-14 (1886).
32. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 604 (1959) (concurring opinion). This
statement is further confirmed by the results of the cases, for state death statutes would
never have been applied if they offended federal policy.
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conviction, perhaps, that formulating the details of such a remedy
was a task unsuitable for the judiciary. In this state of affairs two
quite different reasons for resorting to state law are suggested. The
first, stated by Judge Addison Brown in an early case, is that state
law could be applied because it serves state interests in protecting
life and in averting "the dependency or pauperism of the survivors"
without impairing either substantive federal policy or the general
federal policy of uniformity in maritime affairs.33 The second, by
analogy to decisions applying state time limitations in federal statu-
tory cases,- is that state law is employed to fulfill a federal interest
in giving damages for wrongful death without requiring the courts
to formulate arbitrary beneficiary lists or damage limitations.
It was a dispute over which of these reasons underlies the use of
state wrongful death laws that divided the Supreme Court in the
important case of The Tungus. A workman named Skovgaard bad
met his Maker in a shipboard vat of hot coconut oil, and his widow
sought relief on the ground that the ship had been unseaworthy.
Had Skovgaard survived, he could have recovered under the maritime
law on this ground. But the Justices all agreed there could be no
recovery for death except under the state statute; and "'if the
admiralty adopts the statute as a rule of right to be administered
within its own jurisdiction,"' the Court quoted from The Harrisburg,
"'it must take the right subject to the limitations which have been
made a part of its existence.'" 6 Relief was allowed because of the
decision below that New Jersey would construe its statute to encom-
pass an unseaworthiness case. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by three
other Justices, argued that the state statute merely provided a remedy
for enforcing the federal obligation to keep the ship seaworthy, and
therefore that it was immaterial whether or not the state would give
relief in the particular case: "Any state statute which generally pro-
vides remedies for tortious death can and should be drawn upon by
the maritime law in enforcing the federal cause of action."37
Mr. Justice Brennan's view was simply untenable if state death
statutes are applied out of deference to state policy: "[R]ealistically
it seems that to apply 'state law' in a situation to which the state
would hold it inapplicable is not to apply state law at all."38 But
Mr. Justice Brenan's position was based upon a contrary premise.
In cases applying state statutes of limitation, he explicitly reasoned,
the death laws are utilized to further federal rather than state policy:
33. The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
34. See Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961).
35. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
36. Id. at 592.
37. Id. at 603.
38. The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 H.nv. L. REv. 84, 151 (1959).
[ VOL. 21
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"It is the federal maritime law that looks to the state law of remedies
here, not the state law that incorporates a federal standard of care."39
On this hypothesis it seems clear that the Court may pick and choose
at will among the provisions of state law in order to implement
federal policy.4
0
From Mr. Justice Brennan's position it would follow that, just as
the federal court would be free to choose those parts of a state's law
that best fulfilled federal needs, it would be free to choose among
the laws of the several states on the same independent basis. In a
case like Scott, on this view, the choice seems obvious. Since
Massachusetts' antipathy to full indemnity dates from an era in
which wrongful death was a mistrusted novelty and since arbitrary
damage limitations have no place in present policy, Pennsylvania law
should be chosen because it more fully effectuates the federal interest
in providing compensation for the victims of maritime negligence.41
However, Mr. Justice Brennan's hypothesis was rejected in The
Tungus, where the Court made clear that it applied state death laws
in deference to state policy:
The policy expressed by a State Legislature in enacting a wrongful death
statute is not merely that death shall give rise to a right of recovery, nor
39. The Tunga v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 601 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
40. Compare, for example, the recent and controversial decision in Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961), enforcing a foreign remedy
for the death of a resident of the forum state but ignoring the foreign ceiling on
damages as contrary to public policy. After initially holding this procedure uncon-
stitutional on grounds comparable to those of the Tungus majority, the Second Circuit
reversed itself en banc, holding that because the forum state had "a legitimate con-
stitutional interest in the application of its own rules of law" it was free to "absorb"
the foreign rule "into the corpus of New York law" without binding itself to respect
the limitation. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd on rehearing, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S.
39 (1965), supports this analysis.
41. Indeed, on this reasoning Pennsylvania law or another like it should be chosen
even if the case has nothing to do with Pennsylvania, because no maritime case
should be relegated to the unsuitable Massachusetts law and because of the interest
of uniformity. Chinese law, if substantively appropriate, could equally well be used,
for in essence what the Court would be doing is creating a federal remedy by copying
someone else's law. The question naturally arises why the federal courts should be
so modest about their ability to create the remedy without referring to any other law
(Chief Justice Chase on circuit was willing to create the death action. The Sea Gull,
21 F. Cas. No. 12, 578 (C.C.D. Md. 1865); cf. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (statute of limitation)), or
why they do not refer to the uniform wrongful-death provisions of the federal Jones
Act or Death on the High Seas Act. Cf. Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125
(4th Cir. 1966) (Jones Act, not state, time limitation a model for laches in seaman's
injury suit). Mr. Justice Brennan's answer is based upon some traces of legislative
spoor-whose importance I think he exaggerates-that suggest a congressional deference
to state interests in delineating the schedule of beneficiaries, 358 U.S. at 607-08. The
Tungus majority read the same history as a total disclaimer of federal interest. Id. at
593. See The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HAv. L. 11Ev. 84, 152 (1959).
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even that tortious conduct resulting in death shall be actionable, but that
damages shall be recoverable when conduct of a particular kind results in
death. It is incumbent upon a court enforcing that policy to enforce it all;
it may not pick or choose.
42
The Supreme Court has thus settled that the use of state death
laws in admiralty serves state interests alone; no federal maritime
policy, therefore, directs the choice among various state laws in
these cases. It is true that care must be taken that the state law
chosen does not infringe specific federal policies or unduly impair
maritime uniformity, but this fact does not serve to distinguish
diversity cases, for even there state laws cannot be applied if they
are unconstitutional. The only difference between Scott and Klaxon,
therefore, is that state substantive law is referred to in the former
case out of comity and in the latter by compulsion. In terms of
Klaxon's own policy of reducing forum-shopping by assuring the same
outcome regardless of forum, this difference is crucial. Given the
limitations of the current removal statute, the doubt whether diver-
sity's purpose includes the resolution of interstate conflicts, and the
constitutional inability of federal courts to meddle with substantive
law, nothing the Court could have done in Klaxon, short of a radical
tightening of constitutional strictures, would have assured uniformity;
the choice was between intrastate and interstate forum-shopping. In
maritime cases, however, complete uniformity of result can be
achieved by imposing a federal choice-of-law doctrine upon the state
courts under the law-making powers of admiralty.
III. MODERN CHoIcE-oF-LAw ANALYsIs
The preceding discussion demonstrates that those who believe
that federal courts can effectively arbitrate between conflicting state
laws should oppose the application of Klaxon in maritime death
cases. Modem choice-of-law thinking, however, suggests this task
may not be so easy as it might appear.
Once upon a time choice-of-law rules were viewed as a set of laws
quite independent from the substantive rules among which they
selected. The validity of a contract, for example, was to be de-
termined by the law of the place of contracting-or, some said, by
the law of the place of performance, or by the law chosen by the
42. 358 U.S. at 593. The position that state interests may justify applying state
death laws was reaffirmed in Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960), in which the
Court permitted relief under a state wrongful-death law providing a more stringent
standard of conduct than that of the maritime law. Because the defendant's acts did
not violate any federal duty, recovery served only state and not federal policies.
Yet Mr. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Hess was not inconsistent with his view in
Tungus, for he was willing to allow relief where either federal or state policy so
demanded.
[ VOrL. 21
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parties.43 Whether the law selected granted or denied recovery was
deemed irrelevant; the content of the law was examined only after
the choice had been made. But this approach overlooked the teach-
ing of Holmes and others that laws are adopted in order to accom-
plish social purposes44 and should be applied accordingly. Since
enlightened judges for some time had been construing statutes in the
light of legislative policy,45 it was only a matter of time until this
process was applied to cases involving more than one jurisdiction.
The recent California decision in Reich v. Purcell46 is illustrative.
Two Ohio residents were killed by the negligence of a Californian in
a Missouri collision. Missouri limited wrongful-death recovery to
25,000 dollars, and under the traditional theory this limitation would
have been applied because Missouri was the place of the tort. But,
by construing the Missouri law in the light of its purpose, the
California court held the limitation inapplicable:
Missouri's limitation on damages expresses an additional concern for de-
fendants, . . . in that it operates to avoid the imposition of excessive
financial burdens on them. . . . We fail to perceive any substantial interest
Missouri might have in extending the benefits of its limitation of damages
to travelers from states having no similar limitation. . . . Under these cir-
cumstances giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full recovery to
injured parties does not conflict with any substantial interest of Missouri.47
This analysis puts quite another light not only on Scott but on
Klaxon as well. For the California court's position, increasingly
accepted by the courts, is that choice-of-law is not an independent
body of rules but is intimately bound up with the content and policy
of the competing substantive laws. In Reich, for example, the ques-
tion whether Missouri's statute applies to an accident involving only
nonresidents was a question of Missouri law, just as was the question
whether the statutory term "wrongful act" encompasses unseaworthi-
ness or a manufacturer's strict liability for harm caused by defective
products. Thus the choice between state laws in a federal court is in
very large part a matter of state law; but not necessarily, as Klaxon
held, of the law of the forum state.48
Applying this analysis to Scott, one must first determine by inter-
pretation the interstate reach of the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts
43. See the discussion of these three roles in 2 J. BFA.E, Co 'ricT or LAws
1077-1100 (1935).
44. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hiv. L. REv. 457, 465-69 (1897).
45. E.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944).
46. 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Sup. Ct. 1967), discussed in a symposium in
15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. (1968).
47. Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Sup. Ct. 1967).




damage provisions. Insofar as Pennsylvania law is concerned the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has substantially answered the question,
holding in Griffith v. United Air Lines49 that Pennsylvania law applied
to permit full indemnity for the death of a Pennsylvanian in a
Colorado plane crash, notwithstanding a Colorado provision limiting
damages to those incurred before death:
Pennsylvania's interest in the amount of recovery . . . is great. The rela-
tionship between decedent and United was entered into in Pennsylvania.
Our Commonwealth, the domicil of decedent and his family, is vitally
concerned with the administration of decedent's estate and the well-being of
the surviving dependents to the extent of granting full recovery, including
expected earnings. This policy is so strong that it has been embodied in
the Constitution of Pennsylvania .... 50
Griffith differs from Scott in that Pennsylvania was the origin of the
flight in the former case and the destination in the latter. This hardly
seems relevant to Pennsylvania's announced policy of compensating
the dependents of its wrongfully killed residents, and the decedents in
both cases were Pennsylvanians. Where the ticket was bought does
not appear from the Scott opinion, but the prevalence of round-trip
arrangements suggests that even in this case the "relationship" may
have been entered into in Pennsylvania, if that is important.
51
Griffith indicates also that Pennsylvania would not be likely to defer
to Massachusetts policy in a case like Scott, for the court considered
not only the possibility that Colorado's limitation expressed a policy,
inapplicable in Pennsylvania, of relieving Colorado courts from the
task of computing conjectural damages, but also the possibility that
49. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
50. Id. at 24-25, 203 A.2d at 807.
51. Professor Cavers has argued that the victim's residency in the state is not
enough to bring a case within a state's policy of granting relief for wrongful death.
Consequently he insists that the more generous law of the victim's home state should
not be applied unless that state is also the one "in which a relationship has its seat."
D. CAvEs, Ti CHoicE-oF-LAw PnocF-ss 166, 167-76 (1965). In part, one suspects
Mr. Cavers' caution is inspired by the danger of unfair surprise. Cf. People v. One
1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal.2d 595, 599, 311 P.2d 480, 482 (1957), where the court
on this ground refused to extend to a Texas lender a California law requiring auto-
mobile mortgagees to make character investigations designed to reduce the narcotics
traffic: "A person financing the sale of an automobile in Texas for use exclusively in
that state . . . cannot reasonably be expected to familiarize himself with and comply
in Texas with the statutes of the 48 or more jurisdictions into which the automobile
could possibly be taken .... " But this element, the Pennsylvania court thought, was
lacking in Griffith. "United . . . does business in and flies over other States, including
Pennsylvania, which do not limit recovery. Certainly, United could reasonably antici-
pate that it might be subject to the laws of such states and could financially protect
itself against such eventuality." 416 Pa. 1, 24, 203 A.2d 796, 807 (1964). Whether
or not this argument counters Professor Cavers' objections in his hypothetical cases,
it seems to fit Scott as well as Griffith. In terms either of expectations or simply of
siguificant contacts it should be sufficient that Pennsylvania was the flight's destination.
[ VoL. 21
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the limitation was "intended to protect Colorado defendants from
large verdicts." Nevertheless the court applied Pennsylvania law,
finding Pennsylvania's interest great and minimizing Colorado's by
pointing out that "although United obviously does some business in
Colorado, it is not domiciled there."52 Eastern, the defendant in Scott,
is in the same position with regard to Massachusetts, and thus it seems
quite probable that Pennsylvania would apply its own law to a case
like Scott.
Things are less clear from the Massachusetts side of the picture.
It may still be Massachusetts law that the Massachusetts limit applies
to all accidents occurring in that state,53 although in some cases this
would violate modern notions of full faith and credit.M On an
interest analysis Chief Justice Traynor's reasoning in Reich v. Purcell55
suggests the purpose of the limitation is likely to be the protection of
Massachusetts defendants from excessive liability. Just who is a
"Massachusetts defendant" is not clear, but plainly the term includes
Northeast Airlines (the defendant in the famous Kilberg case), 56
which is incorporated in that state and has its principal place of
business there.57 The Griffith opinion suggests that the place of
incorporation may be critical; but, even apart from possible equal-
protection problems,58 a state might reasonably want to extend its
financial protection to foreign corporations engaged in local business,
if only for the selfish purpose of encouraging their operations. 9 In-
deed the place of incorporation is quite likely (as in Scott, where it
was Delaware) to be a state without substantial connections with
the enterprise, or even without any connection at all.60 Whether
52. 416 Pa. 1, 24, 203 A.2d 796, 807 (1964).
53. Cf. Medeiros v. Perry, 332 Mass. 158, 159, 124 N.E.2d 240, 241 (1955), a
guest-statute case: "Since the accident happened in Rhode Island, the law of that
State governs the question of liability;" First Nat'l Bank v. Fairhaven Amusement Co.,
347 Mass. 243, 244, 197 N.E.2d 607, 608 (1964) (statute of frauds): "The con-
tract was made in this Commonwealth, . . . and its enforceability is to be determined
by the law of Massachusetts." The First Circuit was more optimistic in Shanahan v.
George B. Landers Constr. Co., 266 F.2d 400 (1959), for it predicted that Massachu-
setts would refuse to follow several possible single-contact rules for determining the
law governing repossession of a power hoe. Although the court forgot to say why it
made the choice it did, the opinion lists various contacts after the manner of the
worst New York opinions. See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961).
54. E.g., if both parties were from Pennsylvania. See D. Currie, Reich v. Purcell, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REv. (1968).
55. 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
56. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961), discussed
in B. CURRI, SELECrED ESSAYS ON T-M CoNwuCT OF LAws 690-721 (1963).
57. See Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.2d 717, 719 (2d Cir. 1967).
58. See B. CumuE; supra note 56, ch. 11.
59. Id. at 704.
60. The New York Post Corporation, for instance, is incorporated in Delaware.
See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 1967). For a case
study of the danger of basing an interest upon paper incorporation or ship registration,
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Massachusetts, on a policy analysis, would hold its damage law to
extend to Massachusetts accidents of a Delaware corporation doing
considerable Massachusetts business but with its principal place of
business perhaps in New Yorkl' is an unanswered question.
Assuming both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania would apply their
own damage rules in Scott, we are confronted by what seems to be a
true conflict in state policies. Only at this point, it seems to me, is
it proper to speak of a federal doctrine of choice-of-law; for up to
this point the issue has been one of the construction of Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts laws. But here the argument for an independent
federal decision becomes strong. If forum-shopping is to be avoided,
such an independent decision is necessary, because otherwise each
state may simply apply its own law. Additionally, the disinterested
federal court is ideally situated to make an impartial choice. But here
too, a practical question arises: How is the court to make the choice?
Brushing aside the unconvincing argument that choosing between
competing state interests is undemocratic, 62 which law should be
chosen in Scott? If the choice cannot rationally be made, the state
courts have the escape route of applying their own law, though this
causes an undesirable lack of uniformity; but the federal court, with
no law of its own to apply, is in a very uncomfortable situation.
63
Consequently, if the conflict cannot be resolved, there is something
to be said for resorting to Klaxon when all else fails, in order at least
to minimize intrastate forum-shopping.6
The magnitude of this problem is not so great as it may appear,
for by more discriminating comparative analysis of the importance
to each state of enforcing its policy in the particular case, a choice
may often be made even in an apparent case of true conflict.65 This
type of analysis was explicitly employed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
see D. Currie, Flags of Convenience, American Labor, and the Conflict of Laws, 1963
Si. CT. REv. 34.
61. More specific information on this question could perhaps be obtained from
decisions determining the "principal place of business" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)
(1964), although it is not certain that this term should have the same meaning for
Massachusetts limitation policy as for diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, the difficulty
and arbitrariness of making decisions under § 1332(c), see Kelly v. United States
Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960), suggest it might be more trouble than it
is worth to incorporate the principal-place-of-business test into the interpretation of
Massachusetts damage law.
62. See B. Cunr.E, supra note 56, at 124, 272-80.
63. See B. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTEMIP. Pnon. 754
(1963).
64. This unpalatable suggestion is even less digestible when, as in interpleader and
in admiralty suits in rem, the courts of the state in which the federal suit is brought
may not be open at all, or when the state court itself is disinterested.
65. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963);
B. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LA w & CoNrTEsr . Pnon. 754, 757-59
(1963).
E VOL. 21
STATE LAWS IN MARITIME DEATH CASES
Court in McSwain v. McSwain66 to forbid an interspousal suit upon
a Colorado accident because of Pennsylvania's interests in preserving
the harmony of Pennsylvania families and in protecting their insurers
from collusion:
[A]lithough Colorado, as the state of both the conduct and injury could
assert an interest in this litigation in order to further the deterrence of
negligent conduct on its highways and to secure, in the event of insurance,
a fund for the payment of local creditors, those interests would not be
disserved by the application of the Pennsylvania rule of interspousal im-
munity in the instant case.
. . . Since negligent operation of a motor vehicle invariably involves
some hazard to persons beyond the family relationship, potential liability
still remains to deter unreasonable conduct on the part of those able to
insulate themselves from intrafamily suit.
Moreover, with regard to Colorado's interest in securing a fund for the
payment of local medical creditors, that interest would not be adversely
affected under the facts of the instant case. Since the accident resulted in
near immediate death, significant debts are not likely to have been incurred
in Colorado.
67
When this comparative analysis is feasible, I see no reason why
the federal courts should not employ it in maritime wrongful-death
cases. This point is obvious if both states would agree that the same
law applies, for then as a matter of state law there is no conflict.
The same process should be followed regardless of whether the
states would agree, for comparative analysis enables the court to
assure a uniform result in every forum (viewing the question as one
of federal law and the answer therefore as binding on state courts),
and it most fully comports with the Supreme Court's decision in The
Tungus that in maritime death cases state interests should be effec-
tuated.68
66. 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966). Accord, Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30,
216 A.2d 781 (1966). Cf. the pioneer opinion in Bemkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d
588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961), narrowly construing a California statute of frauds in the
light of Nevada policy and the parties' expectations.
67. McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 96, 215 A.2d 677, 682-85 (1966).
68. I agree with Professor Baxter, see note 65, supra, at 33, that this principle
should perhaps be extended to diversity cases by holding the comparative-impairment
principle dictated by the full faith and credit clause. So long as that clause is read
to give greater freedom than this to the states, however (see the permissive dictum
in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962), and Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.
2d 588, 360 P.2d 906 (1961), where the California court deferred to Nevada policy
through declaring its constitutional freedom to follow its own), the Erie principle of
maximum respect for state interests, promoted by the federal courts' independent
analysis, competes against the Erie principle against intrastate forum-shopping. Both
Baxter and Professor Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1191 (1967), argue that the federal courts should repudiate Klaxon
in diversity cases even in the absence of a constitutional directive. Horowitz would base
a federal common law of conflicts upon such analogies as Banco National v. Sabbatino,
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I have difficulty applying the comparative-impairment principle to
the Scott problem. Professor Cavers has argued that in the very
similar Kilberg case, involving a New Yorker killed in Massachusetts
while flying from New York on a plane belonging to a Massachusetts
corporation, all courts should apply New York's full-indemnity
provision:
[N]ortheast also operates out of New York City, and there it entered
into a relationship, carrier and passenger, with a New York citizen, under-
taking to carry him to Massachusetts, a venture that exposed him to the risk
of death if Northeast failed to complete the trip successfully. For New York
to assert that the purpose of its constitutional ban on wrongful death re-
covery ceilings extended to this case seems to me plainly reasonable. New
York's concern with the relationship does not stop when the New York State
boundary is crossed. Yet, if New York cannot continue the financial protec-
tion it prescribes when the plane leaves New York, then the state's effective
control over the relationship is seriously impaired.
[T]he concern of Massachusetts would seem confined to one party to
the relationship, the airline. Though that party would lose the benefit of
the Massachusetts ceiling, giving preference to the law removing the ceiling
would still leave the ceiling on wrongful-death recoveries intact in most
Massachusetts cases. . . . [T]he ceiling would continue to apply to nearly
all actions based on in-state wrongful deaths: it would apply not only to
all such actions involving Massachusetts persons but also where either the
person causing the death or the person killed had a home in, or a close
business connection with, Massachusetts, except where the existence of
an out-of-state relationship justified resort to the other state's more protective
rules.69
If this is persuasive, and if an equally certain choice can be made
on the slightly different facts of Scott, then by all means the federal
court should make that choice. However, if the competing interests
appear evenly balanced, in this case or in another, a further tool must
be found. Since state interests in such a case would be equally
served by either result, it is appropriate to consider other relevant
policies such as the desire for uniformity and predictability. These
376 U.S. 398 (1964), and Baxter upon his reading of the purpose of diversity and of
the concluding phrase of 28 U.S.C. § 1652. Baxter, supra note 65, at 34-42. But see
CAvxas, supra note 51, at 217-18, suggesting that to impose federal choice-of-law rules
might be incompatible with the freedom the Supreme Court has allowed the states
under the full faith and credit clause. The American Law Institute proposes to free
the diversity court from Klaxon in interpleader cases and those within the projected
"dispersed parties jurisdiction." See Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between
State and Federal Courts, pt. I, 39, 46 (Official Draft 1965). Professor Cavers ap-
proves because "in this limited body of cases," where jurisdictional barriers preclude
state courts from acting, federal judges "can contribute to the development of doctrine
from a national viewpoint without introducing new elements of uncertainty into the
state law or curtailing the exercise of substantive state power." CAvEs, supra note
51, at 223-24.
69. CAvEus, supra note 51, at 167-69.
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policies would be well served by a totally arbitrary rule that is
simple to administer, as some of the first Restatements rules were
not.7° Perhaps the best answer would be to apply the law of the
state first, in alphabetical order.
71
Professors von Mehren and Trautman have suggested, among other
things, that the courts in refractory cases should prefer a policy that
is "emerging" to one that is "on the wane," on the ground that the
state with the latter policy may not hold it very strongly.72 I have
my doubts about the propriety and workability of a court's attempting
to divine the expiration of unrepealed statutes in domestic or false-
conflict cases.73 However, I am not certain that the von Mehren-
Trautman suggestion amounts to overruling the legislature in
true-conflict cases, for the problem is one of construction in the light
of circumstances very probably unforeseen by the legislature. Nor
am I altogether convinced the exercise, if proper at all, need be
confined to cases in which a policy is found to be waxing or waning,
though such a circumstance tends to camouflage the judicial legisla-
tion. It has been argued that a court should not abandon a local
policy in conflicts cases unless it is prepared to do so in domestic
cases as well;7 4 but the desire to respect the interests of other states
is perhaps a distinguishing factor, as it was in McSwain,75 where any
deterrent policy of a law allowing interspousal suits was subordinated
to another state's interest. Since courts commonly make frank choices
among competing local policies on the basis of social desirability, it
may not be inappropriate for them to make similar choices in conflicts
cases in which competing state interests otherwise appear to be in
balance.
If this kind of substantive choice is ever appropriate, one place to
use it is in a case like Scott, where it can be imposed upon the state
70. E.g., the place-of-contracting rule, which took many sections to define.
71. Cf. B. Comuu, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CoNI'amcT OF LAws 609 (1963).
72. A. VON MEmiEN & D. Tn~umrA, TIH LAW% OF MuLTiSTATE TIANSACTiONS 376-
78, 394-95 (1965). See also id. at 407, suggesting that, when one state prohibits what
another permits, "the scale can be tipped in favor of the advancement or promotion
of multistate activity." This argument seems based upon the dubious but freedom-
loving presumption that activity forbidden by one state's law but not another's is
desirable. Professor Horowitz, supra note 68, also speaks of "multistate policies"
such as facilitating multistate transactions.
73. See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and
Borax, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 26, 59 (1966).
74. CurmnE, supra note 71, at 153-54, n.82, 707.
75. See text accompanying note 66 supra. The analogy seems persuasive when
the domestic rule survives only from stare decisis, but less so when it derives from
statute; for it may be strained to argue that though the legislature thought its own
the better policy it was prepared to be overruled by the courts whenever another
state was equally concerned.
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courts as well as the federal.7 Beyond this it might also be desirable
in non-maritime cases too for the Supreme Court to make such
choices as a matter of constitutional law in order to achieve uniform-
ity. This of course would eliminate the whole Klaxon problem. The
Court certainly has not indicated a disposition to embark on such a
project, 7 and, unless it does so, a federal choice based on substantive
preference in a simple diversity case might run afoul of the Erie
principle.7
8
On either a wax-wane or a social-desirability basis the choice in
Scott seems clear: The Massachusetts limitation is a vestigial remnant
of bad policy.
Thus the argument for relying upon the choice-of-law principles of
the forum state in a case like Scott boils down to a last resort, when
all attempts to resolve the conflict by rational means have failed.
Much of the analysis leading to this conclusion, moreover, is equally
applicable to other cases in which state law is referred to outside the
compulsion of Erie. But a caveat is in order: In some cases-for
example, the statute of limitation situation-the state law is utilized
to serve federal interests, not state interests as in maritime death
suits. In such cases an analysis of state policy is not relevant; the
question should be simply which state law most effectively furthers the
federal goal. In some instances, moreover, it may not be easy to
determine whether the use of state law serves federal or state ends,
or both. For example, in referring to state law for the definition of
"child" in the copyright act, the Supreme Court in DeSylva V. Bal-
lentine7 9 observed that states might have an interest in determining
who succeeds to the property and also that no federal definition was
readily available. The resolution of competing interests in a case in
76. Cf. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (burden of proof
respecting fraud in release of maritime tort liability).
77. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962) (dictum). A strong argument can be made, moreover,
that the full faith and credit clause was not meant to allow the Supreme Court in
effect to make substantive law in fields reserved by the Constitution or left by Congress
to the states. But see note 78 infra.
78. But see B. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. Paon. 754,
779-80 (1963), arguing that a disinterested state court is constitutionally free to make
such a choice or to apply its own law (if this accords with that of an interested state)
because the full faith and credit and due process clauses simply require that the law
applied be that of one or another interested state. Currie argued, indeed, that the
federal courts should make a choice based on substantive preference in interpleader
cases, and perhaps also whenever the diversity court sits in or hears a case transferred
from a disinterested state. Id. at 788-89, 792 & n.126. In ordinary diversity cases,
apart from the constitutional question and the comparable effect of the Rules of
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964), and assuming that such a choice is otherwise
appropriate, the issue reverts to the primordial debate over Klaxon: the relative
demerits of interstate and intrastate shopping and the purposes of the diversity grant.
79. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
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which both state and federal interests are at stake presents a problem
even more complex than that in Scott.
IV. THE OPION
Finally a word should be said about the Third Circuit's opinion
in Scott. Although the plaintiff had invoked the diversity rather than
the admiralty jurisdiction, the court quite rightly held that this was
immaterial. In a federally dominated field like maritime law it would
make no sense to allow the result to depend upon such a fortuity,
even if no federal policy dictated the choice between state laws.,,
From this point on, however, the opinion is on shaky ground. Erie
and Klaxon, said Judge Hastie, are inapplicable because "the mari-
time character of the tort brings the controversy under the governance
of federal law .... Obviously, a court thus undertaking to apply fed-
eral substantive law would have no occasion to defer to or to apply
state choice of law rules."81 This reasoning would be impeccable if
indeed federal law applied; but, as the opinion recognizes, the choice
is between Massachusetts and Pennsylvania law, not federal. I agree
that Klaxon should not be applied, except in extremis; but not for
the court's reason.
In support and in application of its decision that state choice-of-
law rules were irrelevant, the court of appeals purported to find the
choice of Massachusetts law compelled by precedent:
The maritime law will accord dependents and survivors rights of recovery
neither more nor less extensive than they would enjoy under the law of
the state within whose territorial waters the fatal maritime tort occurred.
Hess v. United States, 1960, 361 U.S. 314; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 1959,
358 U.S. 588; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 1921, 257 U.S. 233; The H. S.
Inc., 3d Cir. 1942, 130 F.2d 341.
Of course some other expedient might have been adopted. Borrowing
could have been made from the law of the decedents domicile or the law
of the state whose contacts with the parties, their dealings and the mishap
were deemed most significant. But, over the years, the Supreme Court and
the inferior courts under its guidance have adhered to the simple rule of
borrowing in their entirety the wrongful death and survival rules of the
state within whose boundaries the maritime tort occurred.82
None of the cases cited is authority for this proposition. The courts
have sometimes said the law of the state of the wrong was applicable,
but not in response to the question posed in Scott; for the issue in
all the cases cited was whether the use of state law violated federal
principles, not which state's law to choose. The reference to the law
of the tort state was natural enough, since in each instance that
80. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410-11 (1953).




was the law put forward by the plaintiff; but it does not seem proper
to blame the Supreme Court for having decided an issue not pre-
sented. Moreover, the Hess case arose under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which contains its own federal choice-of-law rule re-
quiring application of "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."83 Thus even a square holding on the interstate issue in
Hess could not have had general applicability.8
Finally, a mechanical federal reference to the law of the place of
the wrong would run counter not only to the Supreme Court's gen-
erally enlightened approach to conflicts between federal and foreign
law,815 to its own use of the interest analysis over a considerable period
in constitutional choice-of-law litigation, 6 and to its obiter endorse-
ment of state court decisions departing from the traditional tort rule,87
but most pertinently to the basic reasoning of its recent Tungus and
Hess decisions in the maritime-death field itself, which the Third
Circuit mistakenly cites in support of its position. As explained above,
the thrust of those decisions is that state wrongful-death laws are
employed in admiralty to serve state and not federal interests. It
does not well comport with this principle willy-nilly to follow the
law of the place of the wrong, for other states may be at least equally
concerned. Indeed in some cases, as recently held in Reich v.
Purcell,88 to apply the law of the tort state may frustrate the policy
of one state without furthering the interest of any other.
Following Massachusetts law would not be that terrible in Scott,
but it is certainly to be hoped and expected that on rehearing the
Third Circuit will give more consideration to this complicated issue
and will improve upon the reasoning of its original opinion.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
84. Further, the Supreme Court since Hess has held that the Tort Claims Act
refers not to the substantive law of the place of the accident, as held in Scott, but to
the whole law (including conflicts rules) of the state in which the negligence took
place, Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962)-quite a different animal when,
as in some cases arising from the Boston crash, see Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316
F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963), one of the claims is for negligent manufacture of an aircraft
engine.
85. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), considering all significant
contacts in the context of statutory construction. For a less modem attack, still
however recognizing that the task is construction, see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
372 U.S. 10 (1963), criticized in D. Currie, Flags of Convenience, American Labor, and
the Conflict of Laws, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
86. E.g., Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), upholding a workmen's compensation award by
the state of employment although the injury took place elsewhere, and without resort-
ing to a sophistical contract characterization.
87. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962).
88. See note 46 supra.
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